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The effect of an exogenous change in wheat prices on the welfare of farmers,
middlemen, consumers and the government is analysed in" a partial" equilibrium
framework under a wide range of elasticity assumptions. The resulting computer
simulations yield the tradeoffs for various policies. Although pareto optimality
calls for equating the consumer, producer and international prices, this policy





In Pakistan, the prices of most of the major agricultural crops are controlled.
The government guarantees to procure wheat, rice, sugarcane and cotton at fIxed
prices. It is, therefore, very important to develop a theoretical framework which
allows us to analyse the effects of changes in these prices on the production and
consumption of the crops, and on the incomes o~producers, consumers, middlemen
and the.government.
For example, the government has recently announced an increase in the
procurement price of wheat, with a view to increasing its domestic produotion and
lowering wheat imports. Some relevant questions may be raised. How does this
affect the quantity of wheat marketed? Should the controlled price of wheat to the
consumer be changed? By how much? Woul~ this affect the price of wheat in the
open market? How does the quantity of wheat sold in the open market vary with
changes in the procurement price and consumer price? By how much does an
increase jn price lower its demand? What is its impact on imports of wheat? How
are the incomes of farmers, middlemen, cOl).sumersand the government affected by
changesin these price policies?
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In this paper, an attempt is made to answer quantitatively some of the ques-
tions raised above. A partial equilibrium approach is used which analyses the gains
and losses in income from wheat price changes where the earnings and expenditure of
wheat only are taken into consideration. It ignores the effect of raising the procure-
ment price of wheat on the production of sugarcane, cotton or edible oils. This
leaves some pertinent questions unanswered, but then they are beyond the scope of
this paper. Are there net foreign exchange savingsdue to a decrease in wheat imports
or are the savings from wheat offset by a rise in the imports of edible oils or by a
decline in the exports of cotton? Are the additional profits' to farmers from the
higher farmgate price of wheat partially offset by a decrease in the profits due to
lowered production of the other crops?
Despite the fact that this partial equilibrium approach ignores some important
questions, it highlights some important links in the chain leading from a change in
controlled prices to their effect on incomes, and enables us to obtain rough estimates
of the gains and losses to various groups. A general equilibrium approach, which
spells out demand and supply relationships for each of the major crops to yield a set
of simultaneous equations, would require detailed data on prices and quantities of
the major crops and on other exogenous variables (to identify the equations). These
data, even if they exist, are very difficult to obtain.
A step towards removing some of the shortcomings of our approach is to
consider cross elasticities of wheat with respect to other major crops. In this paper,
no such attempt has been made due to two reasons. Firstly, reliable estimates of
cross elasticities are even more difficult to obtain than those of own elasticities, and
the alternative of doing further simulations would tax the readers' patience. Second-
ly, our results show that it is the change in exogenous price times quantity rather
than the change in quantity times price which mainly accounts for the change in
incomes. Thus the loss to farmers from a decreased production of other major crops
would be small as compared to the gain to farmers from an exogenous change in the
wheat price.
THE WHEAT MARKET IN PAKISTAN
Understanding the size and functioning of the wheat market is essential to an
understanding of this paper. Last year's (May 1977 to Apri1l978) poor wheat crop
is estimated at 8.1 million tons. Of this, about 7.3 million tons were available for
consumption after due allowances for seeds and wastage. Imports for the current
year are estimated to be 2.25 million tons. Making the assumption of uniform
average yield on varying farm sizes, and estimating the marketable surplus on these
farm sizes, we can arrive at an estimate of the quantity of wheat marketed - about
2.8 million tons [see Appendix I].
The government sets a price at which it stipulates to procure wheat from
hUllers. This price is currently Rs. 37/maund (1 maund = 37.32 kilograms). From
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last year's wheat crop, the government has bought an estimated 1.1 million tons.
The remainder of the marketable surplus (1.7 million tons) was sold in the open
market by arhtis (middlemen). Before being sold in the open market, the wheat was
processed to yield good quality flour and was then sold at an average price of
Rs. 57/maund.
The wheat sold to the government is, on the average, of a slightly inferior
quality. It is mixed with imported wheat and sold to flour mills at Rs. 32/maund
(issue price). The wheat is processed and sold by the government ration shops to the
consumer at Rs. 36/maund. The fact that consumers are willingto pay Rs. 57/maund
for essentially the same product in terms of nutritional value is due to a difference in
quality. The ration shop wheat does not make good white chapatis (thin, flat cakes
of coarse unleavened bread) because it contains imported wheat which has different
characteristics. Thus there are essentially two grades of wheat on the demand side
which are treated as differentcommodities-- one sold in the ration shops and the
other in the open market. On the supply side, however, there is only one type of
wheat that is sold either to the government or to arhtis (middlemen).
In a survey conducted by a management consulting firm, the followingreasons
were given for farmers' preferences for selling wheat to the arhtis as opposed to the
government.
The farmers who expressed preference for selling to the arthi stated that this
was so because the arthi comes to buy the wheat (37%) makes on-the-spot
cash payment (30%), sometimes advancesloans (27%), is honest in weighing,is
available whenever needed, supplied gunny bags and maintains a continuing
relationship with the farmer [1] .
On the other hand, the following reasons were given for farmers' preferences
for sellingwheat to the government as opposed to the arhtis:
Those farmers who preferred to sell directly to the purchase centre stated
that they preferred to receive cash payment (48%), did not bear any risks in
payments (30%) and did not have to pay a commission to the arthi (23%).
They were satisfied with weighing at the centre, and did not face other pro-
blems.
The reasons givenby both sets of farmers are similarand appear to b-ebased on
individual farmer conditions rather than on a consistent real price bias either way.
Since farmers are free to sell to the government or the middleman, the middleman
must pay the same real price as the government. Thus the farmgateprice or price paid
by the arhti must equal the procurement price.
. Some farmers sellwheat to the arhtis who later sell it to the government. Since
the wheat eventually reaches the government and ration shops, it is treated as if the
farmer had sold it directly to the government. The reader may well ask what the
incentive is for the arhti to buy and sell at the same price. Actually the arhti will
often be able to buy wheat at a slightly lower price (Rs. 34) from farmers to whom
.......
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there is at'least 'a Rs. 3 transactions cost (transportation, time, etc.) in sellingto the
government. The transactions cost to the arhti would be. lower and hence he could
make a small profit. This small profit to the middleman is ignored in the an~lysisand
the whoat is treated exactly as if it had been sold directly to the government. Note
that the real procurement price, although lower than Rs. 37, is still equal to the
farmgate price. .
In addition, there' are farmers who store wheat and later sell it in the open
market towards pre-harvest time at a higher price. The farmer then plays the role
of both farmer and middleman. The additional income which accrues to the farmer
in his role as middleman is treated as such and included in the gains or losses to
middlemen. .
Some integration between the open market and the government-controlled
market is assumed in this paper. More specifically, it is assumed that a change in
price in one market affects the quantity demanded in the other market. A black
market for ration shop wheat is avoided because $e government either draws on its
stocks or imports additional amounts to compensate for any pressure on the ration
shop price.
MEmODOLOGY
There are two instruments in our model: the procurement price, Pp' and
the issue price, Pg' which are, respectively, the price at whi9h the government buys
wheat from the farmer, and the price at which it sellsto the mills. First an increase
in the procurement pric(:, holding the issue price constant, is considered. The effect
of this change on the incomes of farmers, middlemen, consumers and the government
is examined in turn. The government has already announced the procurement price
increase to Rs. 45/maund and farmers have made their production decisions. It is
instructive to measure the gains and losses to our interest groups caused by this
announcement. Then, the effect on incomes of raising issue price is considered,
assuming that the procurement price is held constant. This is a useful exercise in
itself but is all the more important because the government is considering an increase
in consumer price. For obvious reasons (the price has already been raised), the initial
level of the procurement price for the second exercise will be taken to be
Rs. 45/maund. Thus the paper can be considered as looking at two sets of policies:
(i) increase only the procurement price; and (ii) increase the procurement price along
with the issue price. The interested reader can note that it would not be too difficult
to incorporate changes in the controlled prices of inputs (e.g. fertilizer) into the
analysis. .
This exercise quantifies the change in incomes due to this policy and looks at
the effect on incomes if the issue price is also raised. The latter servesto decreas~the
subsidy bill on wheat by not only reducing the per unit subsidy but by decreasing
total consumption.
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One of three different concepts of income has been used as appropriate for
each of the four groups of people. For farmers and middlemen, it is the change
in profit levels. For consumers, it is the change in consumer surplus,! while for
the government, it is the change in revenues. Throughout, it is assumed that the
four groups of people are mutually exclusive.
Since reliable estimates for the values of some of the parameters used in this
analysis are not available, a computer simulation exercise is carried out for various
parameter values. The justification for not trying harder to obtain estimates for the
parameters is that the results are not very sensitive to changes in these parameters
within plausible ranges.
A list of the notation employed in this analysis is givenat the end of the paper
for reference.2
I
t I. Increase the Procurement Price by M pfa) Effect on Farmers' Incomes
In Fig. l(a), SS is the aggregate supply curve for wheat. At farmgate price,
Pp (equal to procurement price), Qp is produced. Of this, Qf is kept for own con-
sumption by farmers, based on their demand curve, DD. Qf includes wheat for home
consumption, seeds, wastage, and payment to workers in kind.
For simplification, it is assumed that in the case of home consumption of
wheat by farmers, the positive income effect of an increase in farmgate price is
exactly offset by the negative substitution effect so that Qf is fixed for a relevant
range of farmgate prices.
This is illustrated in Fig. l(b) where Dl Dl is the demand curve for wheat by
farmers at income Yl' Income is a positive function of price. When the price is
raised to P2' it increasesthe income of the farmer to Y2 to yield a new demand curve,
D2D2' which coincidentally futersects a vertical line through Qf' Similarly, D3D3
and D4D4' yield the same consumption of wheat at prices P3 and P4' respectively.
By making use of this simplification, we can treat the portion of SS to the right of Qf
as both the marketable surplus curve and the marginal cost curve. Several studies
[e.g. 2] on Pakistan have shown the curve to be positively sloped.
Fig. l(c) is Fig. l(a) redrawn to shift the origin to Qf" In Fig. 1(c), at a price
Pp' farmers are willing to supply a quantity Qp to be marketed. Pp is the
procurement price, which, under our earlier assumption, is also the price at which
farmers sell to middlemen who sell in the open market. When the procurement price
IThis concept, often used to measure consumer welfare, is the area under the demand
curve and above the price line. Since the demand curve represents the price a consumer is willing
to pay while the price line denotes the price he pays, the difference represents a surplus that he
enjoys. .
2Please also note the convention used here of assuming all ~s to be positive. Decreases
























Fig .1. Increasing Pp - The Supply of Wheat
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is raised by ~P , middlemen who wish to sell in the open market must also offer ap
price Pp + ~P P' Farmers increase their production by ~Qp due to a combination of
increased acreage used in wheat and higher yields because it is now profitable to buy
a larger quantity of fertilizer per acre, or obtain improved seeds and water facilities.
The elasticity of marketable surplus, eS, which measures the responsiveness of a
change in farmgate price to a change in wheat marketed, is an aggregate of the
acreage effect, the yield effect and the income effect. The increase in profits is given
by the area 2+3, the difference between increased revenues by 2+3+4, and increased
costs by 4.
The magnitude of area 2 is Qp ~P P' We can approximate area 3 by assuming
that the segment of the supply curve between Qp and Qp + ~Qp is linear. This area
is then 1/2 ~P p ~Qp' The total increase in profits for farmers is given by
(a)
........ Qp ~Pp + 1/2 ~PP ~Qp
where ~Qp =eS Qp ~P piP p' and eS is the elasticity of marketable surplus.
(1)
(b)
(b) Effect on Middlemen's Incomes
In Fig. 2, DD is the demand curve for open market wheat and RR the corre-
sponding marginal revenue curve. Initially, the middlemen can buy wheat at a price
Pp up to a level of output Qp' After this point, they have to buy along the supply
curve TT'MC. The marginal cost curve is given by STT'MC. The profit maximizing
monopolist buys a quantity Qo where his marginal cost equals marginal revem..e,and
chargesa pricePo' Hisprofit is givenby (Po - Pp) Qo'
When the procurement price is raised by ~P p' the middlemen have to pay
M p more for the wheat they buy from farmers. Tfie new marginal cost is given by
S'T'MC, and, because of the higher price Po + ~P 0' the amount of wheat bought in
the open market reduces by ~Qo' The new profit is given by
1-
(P0 + M 0 - Pp - ~P p) (Qo - ~Qo)'
The loss is, therefore,




Some points are worth noting here.
Middlemen involved in every level from milling to retailing are being lumped
together and treated as one monopolistic middleman. This behavioural assumption
allows us to determine the levels of price and quantity of wheat in the open market
after the price change. In a sense, it tells us the 'best that the middlemen can do
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Fig .3. Increasing Pp- The Rahon Shop
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open market consumer. It is instructive to note that even in this case the most that
the middlemen can pass on in higher prices to the consumer is half the increase in
procurement price and that middlemen must necessarily lose by the increase in
procurement price. The first part of the proposition is proved in Appendix II. To
verify the latter part, consider expression (2) above. Since ~Pp = 2~P 0 and
~Qo < Qo' every term in the loss expression is positive.
(c) Effect on Consumers'Incomes
In Fig. 2, at the procurement price Pp' middlemen sell at Po in the open
market. The surplus enjoyed by the open market consumer is then the area under
DD and above Po' Withan increasein Pp of ~Pp' the price Po rises by M 0 resulting
in a smaller consumer surplus. The change in consumer surplus is the sum of area 1
and area 2 which can be approximated by the expression
Mo (Qo - ~Qo) + 1/2 Mo ~Qo
~P .
where ~Qo = eg Q Qo by defmition,
Po
eg = the demand elasticity of open market wheat, and
~P0 = 1/2 M p from Appendix II.
If there is some interaction between the open market and the government
market, there will be a small increase in the surplus of ration shop consumers. The
increased procurement price induces an increase in the open market retail price as
described earlier. The relative higher price makes consumers switch to ration shop
wheat. Since the price in the government market has not changed, the excess
demand pressure on ration shop wheat must result in a lowering of government
wheat stocks orin increased imports3 and, consequently, in a larger consumer sur.
plus. However, since this effect is tertiary and is negligible as compared with the
consumer loss in the open market, it is ignored in this section. The integration of
the two markets is incorporated in the next part when the effect is more direct.
.. (3)
(d) The Effect on Government Income
The government subsidy on wheat, excluding distributio~ and storage costs,
before the price increase is given by the sum of subsidieson domestic and imported
wheat.
3Govemment wheat stocks and/or: imports will be higher where there is no integration
between the markets and the procurement price is raised. Note that an increase in government
wheat demand must be less than the decrease in open market de~and if wheat is a normal good
because of the. negative income effect of a constant ration shop price and a higher open market
price.
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(Pp - Pg) Qg + (Pi - Pg) Qi (4)
where Qg is the amount of wheat that the government procures from farmers,
Qi is the quantity of imported wheat, and
p. is the import price excluding storage and distribution costs.1
The increase in procurement price causes the per unit subsidy to increase and
results in a larger quantity of wheat offered to the government. The latter is the sum
of two effects: (i) the production of wheat increases from the increased farmgate
price as described earlier; and (ii) the increased procurement price induces an
increase in open market price which leads to a reduction in the quantity of wheat
demanded in the open market. The wheat that would have been sold in the open
market is then sold to the government in addition to the entire incre1se in marketed
surplus. Therefore, the government purchases an additional amount t1Qg, given by
the expression:
M
p d MoeS- Q + e - Q
P g 0 P 0
p 0
The quantity of imported wheat must decrease by the same amount since the
ration shop price has not changed. The total demand for wheat has fallen by the
second term above while the total supply has increased by the first term in the above
expression.4
The subsidy after the price increase is given by
(Pp + M p - Pg) (Qg+ t1Qg)+ (Pi - Pg) (Qi - t1Qg)
Subtracting (4) from (5) we get the increase in subsidy to be5
(5)
(Qg + t1Qg) M p - (Pi - Pp) t1Qg
which is positive for all plausible values of eSand e~.
II. Increase the Issue Price by M g
It is assumed that this results in an increase of M g in the retail ration shop
price Pc' In other words, raisingPg from Rs. 32 to Rs. 34/maund increases the retail
ration shop price from Rs. 36 to Rs. 38/maund - a plausible approximation.
4Actually the total demand will have fallen by a little less than the second term due to a
small switch-over effect to ration shop wheat. Again, since this effect is small, it is ignored.
5Ignoring distribution costs is justifiable since the costs of distribution of both domestic
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(a) Effect on Farmers' Incomes
The increased ration shop price does not bring about any change in the price
paid to farmers or the quantity of wheat supplied. The lowered demand for wheat
will be offset by a corresponding decrease in imports leaving domestic production
unchanged. Therefore, this policy does not bring about any change in farmers'
incomes.
(b) Effect on Middlemen's Incomes
If the ration shop wheat market and the open wheat market are assumed to be
completely independent of each other, there is no change in middlemen incomes.
However, since the two types of wheat are substitutes, raising the price of wheat in
one market is likely to shift the demand curve for open market wheat outward,
thereby increasing both the open market price and th~ quantity demanded as shown
in Fig. 4. The increase in profits shown by the shaded area is givenby
Po Qo + t1Qo (Po + M 0 - Pp) (6)
d d
e t1Pc ec t1Pc
where t1P0 and t1Qo' from Appendix III, are givenby ~ Po and - Qo
respectively. 2e~ Pc 2Pc
(c) Effect on Consumers' Incomes
(i) From Fig. 3 we can readily quantify the loss in consumer surplus of ration
shop consumers as:
where t1Qc =





(ii) The open market consumers face a higher price but purchase a larger quantity
of wheat. The consumer surplus decreases because of the increased price but in-
creases from the larger quantity consumed. The simulations show that both these
effects are small and act in opposite directions which allowsus to ignore them.
(d) Effect on Government Income
As expected, the government gains significantly from this policy. The subsidy
incurred by the government before the price increase is as in expression (4) in the last
part.
The price increase results in a decline in the wheat demanded in the ration
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(L1Qo)because of the cross elasticity effect. The increased demand for wheat in
the open market causes middlemen to buy greater amounts from farmers leavingless
for government procurement. Imports of wheat decreaseby an amount equal to the
difference between L1Qcand L1Qo' The new subsidy is givenby
(P - P - L1P) (Q - L1Q) + (P. - P - L1P) (Q. - L1Q.)
p g. g g g 1 g. g 1 1
eg McQo
where L1Qg= L1Qo = ,
2 Pc
- d L1PcL1Qc
L1Qc- er ' and
Pc
(8)
L1Q. = L1Q - L1Q1 C 0
Subtracting (8) from (4) and substituting for Qg and Qi we get the increase in
government income:
(Q. + Q ) L1P + (p. -P - L1P) L1Q - (p. - P ) L1Q1 g g 1 g g C 1 po
RESULTS
The results of the above exercise are displayed in Tables I and 2. Table I
quantifies the change in incomes of the four groups for varying elasticity estimates.
The range used for the elasticity of marketable surplus of between 0.0 and 0.7
is based on a range of 0.3 to 0.7 estimated by Qureshi [2] and an extreme value
of zero sugge,stedby some pessimists. Ranges for other elasticities were morearbi-
F trarily chosen, based on the author's perceptions. Fortunately most of the results
are not very sensitive to the various assumptions. This is due to the fact that
although the range of elasticities is large, the absolute value of the elasticity is still
small. It is the change in the exogenous price times the quantity rather than the
change in quantity times the price whkh accounts for most of the variation in
incomes.
The first rows of both Table 1 and Table 2 are based on the "most likely" set
of assumptions in the author's view. Table 2 shows the sensitivity in results for
changes in some of the variables about who~e initial values there was some doubt.
Again, the results were encouraging in that they were not very sensitive to relatively
large changesin the variables.
Severalpoints are worth noting.
(i) Since the four groups of people are mutually exclusive,a Rs. 640 million
gain to fannerS from the increase in procurement price is not the net gain but the
gain due to his role as a fanner. A typical fanner will also lose a small amount in so
Table I-A N
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M> =8 M> =2 M> =4 M> =6 p =8 M> =2 M> =4 p =6




eS =.4 ed= 2r'
641.8 641.8 641.8 641.8 -208.9 -166.0
-122.6 -78.8






615.2 615.2 615.2 615.2 -208.9
-166.0 -122.6 -78.8
2"




ed= 4 ed= 2
621.8 621.8 621.8 621.8 -208.9 -166.0
-122.6 -78.8
o' C'
eS =.2 ed= 2r'
628.5 628.5 628.5 628.5 -208.9
-166.0 -122.6 -78.8
ed= 4 ed = 2o' C'
eS =.3 ed = 2r' 635.1 635.1 635.1 635.1 -208.9 -166.0
-122.6 -78.8
ed= 4 ed= 2o' c'
Continued -
"t .t f (, ,
Table I-A - Continued
eS =.5 e=.2
e =.4 e=.2
648.4 648.4 648.4 648.4 -208.9 -166.0 -122.6 -78.8
eS =.6 e=.2
e =.4 e =.2
655.1 655.1 655.1 655.1 -208.9 -166.0 -122.6 -78.8
eS =.7 e=.2
e =.4 ed= 2




eS =.4 e=.O 1::1
e=.4









e =.4 ed= 2


















M =8 M =2 M =4 M =6 M =8
b.P = 2 b.P = 4 M =6












-185.2 -366.5 -545.9 -723.2
-151.9 -25.2 170.6 362.3 -.
0 .
eS =.1 e=.2 -
ed= 4 e=.2




ed = 4 ed = 2
-185.2 -366.5 -545.9 -723.2 -188.5
11.4 207.2 398.9
0 '. c .
eS =.3 . e =.2
-185.2 -366.5 -545.9 -723.2 -170.2
29.7 225.5 417.2





e =.4 . e =.2
-185.2 -366.5 -545.9 -723.2 -133.2 66.3 262.1 453.8
eS =.6 e=.2
e=.4 e.=.2
-185.2 -366.5 -545.9 -723.2 -115.3 84.5 280.3 472.1
eS =.7 e=.2
e =.4 e=.2
-185.2 -366.5 -545.9 -723.2 -97.0 102.8 298.6 ' 490.4
....
Varying 1/ Coo
eS =.4 ed= 0 §
. r .
e =.4 e=.2





-185.2 -367.0 -547.9 -727.7 -151.9 37.8 225.5 411.2
.es =.4 e,;,.3
ed= 4 ed= 2














M> =8 p =2 M> =4 p =6 M> = 8 p = 2 P:4 M> =6
P g g g p g g g
Varying e
eS =.4 e=.2
ed = 1 ed= 2
-187.2 -368.5 -547.9 -725.2 -162.8 37.0 232.8 424.5
o' c'
eS =.4 ed = 2r'
-186.5 -367.9 -547.2 -724.5 -151.9 40.7 236.4 428.1
eg=.2 e=.2
eS =.4 e =.2
-185.5 -367.2 -546.5 - 723.8 -155.5 44.3 240.1 431.8




eS =.4 e =.2
eg=.5 e=.2
-184.5 -365.9 -545.2 -722.5 -148.3 51.6 247.4 439.2
eS =.4 ed= 2r'
-183.9 -365.2 -544.6 -721.9 -144.6 55.3 251.1 442.9
eg=.6 e=.2
Varyinge
eS =.4 e =.2
eg =.4 e=.O
-185.2 -366.5 -545.9 - 723.2 -151.9 50.8 249.3 443.9
Continued -
; \ f ,.
Table 1-B - Continued
eS =.4 ed = 2r'
-185.2 -366.5 -545.9 - 723.2 -151.9 49.4 246.6 439.7
eg =.4 ed = 1c .
eS =.4 e =.2
eg =.4 ed= 3
-185.2 -366.5 -545.9 -723.2 -151.9 46.4 241.0 431.3
c .
eS =.4 e=.2
eg =.4 ed= 4
-185.2 -366.5 -545.9 - 723.2 -151.9 45.2 238.2 427.1
c . ....
Low Variant . ("),
eS =.0 e=.O §
-187.2 -369.5 -551.9 -734.3 -235.9 -53.5 128.8 311.2
t<..





-183.9 -363.7 -538.5 - 708.2 -89.8 136.4 352.4 558.3
*Thefollowinginitial valuesof the variableswere used:
P = 37 P = 36 P = 32 P = 57 Pi = 56p c g 0




Changes in Incomes under Differing Initial Values of Variables
Qp=3.0 Qc=3.3 681.5









*The elasticity assumptions are eS= .4, e: = .2, e~= .4, e~= .2
Note: The initial values of the variables are as in Table I except where otherwise specified.
~ \ -f - (













~'"*The elasticity assumptions are eS = .4, ed = .2, ed = .4, ecd=.2r 0






M> =6 M> =8 M> =2 M> =4 M> =6
g p g g g
641.8 -208.9 -166.0 -122.6 -78.8
641.8 -215.6 -165.3 -114.6 -63.4
641.8 -201.3 -164.8 -127.9 -90.6





Po = 65 641.8
P = 50 641.80 .
Fanners








P =8 P =2 P =4 P =6 M> =8
p g g g P
No Change -185.2 -366.5 -545.9 -723.2 -151.9
Po =65 -185.2 -366.9 -546.2 -723.5 -153.7
Po=50 -184.8 -366.2 -545.5 -722.8 -149.9
Qp =3.0 Qc =3.3 -382.6 -559.3 -733.9 -145.9-204.0
Qo =1.9 Qi =2.2
(millions of rupees)
Government







far as he is a consumer of wheat for seed purposes or acts asa middleman when he
stores wheat. However, the sheer magnitude of the primary gain highlights the fact
that it is the group of farmers that stands to gain considerably from an increase in
procurement price at the expense of the rest of the society.
(ii) The reader is reminded that the pri~e changes are taken sequentially.
Thus, the column of figures below APg= 2, for examJ,>le,shows the aggregateeffect
Of raising procurement price by Rs. 8fmaund and raising the issue price by Rs. 2/-
per maund.
, (iii) Only the consumers in the open market lose by an increase in procure-
ment price; ration shop consumers are unaffected. Conversely,only the ration shop
consumers lose by an increase in the issue price. In Tables 1 and 2, the two effects
are aggregated. However, the reader who wishes to see the effect on only the ration
shop consumer simply has to subtract the elements of the column APp =8 from the
elements of columns APg = 2,4 and 6 to obtain the desired loss.
(iv) The results are fairly insensitive to changes in both parameters and
variable values. For example, if the total production is 8.8 million tons instead of
the estimated 8.1 million tons, the marketable surplus increases to 3.0 million tons
and the profits to farmers to Rs. 681.8 million tons. - ~ increase ofless than 7
percent. The notable exception to this statement is the changein government income
which is quite sensitiveto a change in the elasticity of marketable surplus.
(v) As long as the demand elasticity of rati<>,nshop wheat is not zero and
imports are positive, the gain to government from an increase in issueprice is greater
than the loss to consumers. Furthermore, middlemen also gain from an increase in
issue price whereas farmers are unaffected. On efficiency6grounds alone, it would
be better to raise the issue price. However, raising the issue price leads to a loss to
consumers of ration shop wheat, Le. to the relatively poor consumers. On equity
grounds, increasing the issueprice maynot be justifiable since income cannot readily
be redistributed. The issue, then, is whether an increase of Rs. 200 (151.9 + 48.0)
million in government income, coupled with an increase of Rs. 43 (208.9 - 166.0)
million in middlemen incomes, more than offsetsa Rs. 181 (366.5 -185.2) million
loss to ration shop consumers.
CONCLUSIONSAND POLICYIMPLICATIONS
One of the main contributions of this paper is the measurement of the gains
and losses to our interest groups from the announced increase in procurement price
of wheat, whether ,or not this is accompanied by a hike in the issue price. The
farmers stand to gain over Rs. 600 million from the procurement price increase. The
6Efficiency here is dermed in the pareto optimal sense of having equality between the
consumer price, Pc (the marginal rate of substitution bet~een wheat and rupees), the producer
price, Pg (the marginal rate of transformation in, domestic production), and the international
price Pi l,the marginal rate of transformation in tra~e).
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gain occurs at the expense of middlemen, consumers of open market wheat and the
government. The higher the elasticity of marketable surplus, the smaller the loss to
the government. An optimistic value of 0.7 implies that the government loses only
about Rs. 90 million whereas a pessimisticvalue of 0.0 raises the government subsidy
by. Rs. 236 million. Middlemeri and open-market consumers tend to lose about
Rs. 200 million each for a plausible range of elasticities.
An increase in issue price is better for the country from an efficiency point of
view. With this policy, farmers are unaffected and middlemen gain a little while the
government gains more than the loss to consumers. However, raising of issue price
causes a substantial loss to the relatively poor ration shop consumer.
The most efficient solution would be to equate both the consumption and
procurement prices with the international price, thus eliminating pIke consumption
and production inefficiencies. However, this extreme policy cannot be carried out
overnight and may not even be desirable on account of its adverse impact on poorer
ration shop consumers (to say nothing of subsidies on inputs and other market
inefficiencies which change the optimal solution). Ifincome could be costlessly
and effectively distributed, this policy would clearly be optimal. However, since
taxation is costly and ineffective.and there is virtually no way for the government
to give transfers to the poor other than through lowered prices of essential com-
modities, one now has to trade off a smaller rupee loss of Rs. 181 million to the poor
consumers, with a gain of Rs. 200 million to the government and Rs. 43 million to
the middlemen.
, Similarly, efficiency in trade requires that the domestic price be set equal
to the international price. Again, since the government cannot effectively tax
farmers for their windfall gain and it is not feasible to set up a scheme where the
incremental production is paid Rs. 56/maund (the international price) while ol~
production is paid at the old price, this policy is not very practical.
Thus, depending on one's preferences, and given the constraints on redistribu-
tion, one might w~ll prefer a non-pareto optimal to a'pareto optimal solution. This





The reader will be interested to know that soon after the paper was first











Source: AgriculturalCensusof Pakistan, 1972, for Co!. 2; [I) for Co!.4.
Note: . I. Wheatoutput (Col.3) is basedon theassumptionof sameaverageyieldsondifferent
farm sizes.
2. Figuresin Col. 4 allowfor loss due to seeds and wastage.
.,..
The quantity of wheat marketed is 2.825 million tons with a total production
of 8.16 million tons. With the government's procurement equal to 1.1 million tons,
the size of the open market is 1.725 million tons.
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To Show APo = 1/2 AP P
Appendix II
Let the equation to the demand curve be
Q = f (P) so that we have
P = f -l(Q) = g(Q).




Since Revenue = PQ
= g(Q) Q,
Marginal revenue = g' (Q) + Qg' (Q)
and the slope of the marginal revenue curve is
dMR = g' (Q) + Q g" (Q) + Q g" (Q) + g'(Q)dQ
= 2g' (Q) + Q g" (Q)
If the relevant section of the demand curve is linear, g"(Q) =0 and, hence,
the slope of the MR curve i$ twice the slope of the demand curve.
In Fig. 2, the slope of DF is half that of AC from the result above. Since
BC = EF, DE= 1/2AB.
Thus: if the section of the demand curve where that ~ operative is linear, a
change of APp in the procurement price causes an increase in the open market price




%of area Wheat output %of wheat Marketable -
under wheat (million tons) marketed surplus
(2) (3) (4) (5)
38.62 3.15 29 0.914
29.46 2.41 35 0.844
17.57 .1.43 37 0.529
14.35 1.17 46 0.538
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Appendix III
To Derive Expressions for Qo and Po
Fig. 5 is a simplified linear version of Fig. 4
The increase in Pc shifts the demand curve of open market wheat horizontally
by an amount equal to 2k to D'F' where
d APc d
2k =ec - Qo from the definition of ec'
Pc
Since OR'= ~ OF', DA = ~ DB from similar triangles.
SinceDAisparallelto XYandD'R' isparallelto DX,DA= XYand so the horizontal
shiftin output ishalf the horizontalshiftin demand
edAP
AQ =k=~Q .
0 2P 0c .




where dQ - dQo
dQo Pod -,
eo = dP0 Qo
kPo



















Fig.5. Increasing Pc- The Open Market


















Procurement price of wheat (Rs. 37/maund)
Retail price of ration shop wheat (Rs. 36/maund)
Issue price of wheat - price at which the government sells to the mill
(Rs. 32/maund)
Averageretail price of open market wheat (Rs. 57/maund)
Price of imported wheat (Rs. 56/maund)
Total marketable supply of wheat (2.825 million tons)
Quantity of wheat sold via ration shops - sum of~overnment procured
and imported wheat (3.35 million tons)
,..~
Quantity of wheat'" procured by the government domestically
(1.1 million tons) : 1
,
Quantity of wheat sold,in the open market (Qp - Qg). " ;
Quantityof importedwheat(2.25 milliontons)
Elasticity of marketable surplus
Demand elasticity of ration shop wheat
Demand elasticity of open market wheat
Cross elasticity of open market wheat with respect to ration shop wheat.
(Please note that all .:1sare assumed to be positive by convention.)
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NOTATION
Procurement price of wheat (Rs. 37/maund) ~-
Retail price of ration shop wheat (Rs. 36/maund)
Underemployment in Pakistan
Issue price of wheat - price at which the government sells to the mill
(Rs. 32/maund)
WARREN C. ROBINSON AND NASREEN ABBASI*
Averageretail price of open market wheat (Rs. 57/maund) The paper measures the degree of underemployment in Pakistan through
direct and indirect approaches. In the direct approach, persons working for less
than 35 hours per week are classified as underemployed. The indirect ap-
proach uses estimates of productivity per worker to determine underemploy-
ment in different sectors. The study concludes that underemployment in
Pakistan is small and is largely concentrated in family-organized production
units in agriculture, trade and services.
Price of imported wheat (Rs. 56/maund)
Total marketable supply of wheat (2.825 million tons)
.....
Quantity of wheat sold via ration shops - sum of~overnment procured
and imported wheat (3.35 million tons)
INTRODUCTION
In Pakistan, as elsewhere in the developing world, there is a growing concern
ov~rthe employment situation. Population growth has been occurring at a sustained
rate of around three percent for the last IS. to 20 years and government efforts to
promote family planning have been notably unsuccessful. Thus, the annual in-
crements to the labour force amount to at least 4,000,000 persons and this figure
will grow steadily in the future. These harsh facts are the basis for concern [1;6J.
For many developingeconomies, the saturation point of the traditional family-
enterprise sectors comes quite late and at very high densities. Only then does large-
scale open unemployment develop [15J. Since, in Pakistan, labour force surveys
still return relatively low rates of open unemployment, we fall back on assuming
that "disguised" unemployment must be there. Yet we have no objective measures
of the degree of underemployment in Pakistan; nor do we P!ecisely know its
concentrations in various .sectors, or its trends over time. The present paper is
a step in the direction of getting some such empirical estimates.
,,~
Quantity of whe~t."procured by the government domestically
(1.1 milliontons) :,1.
,
Quantity of wheat sOld,inthe open market (Qp - Qg). " .
Quantity of imported wheat (2.25 million tons)
Elasticity of marketable surplus
Demand elasticity of ration shop wheat
Demand elasticity of open market wheat
Cross elasticity of open market wheat with respect to ration shop wheat.
Defming Underemployment
In recent years, there has been an increasing emphasis on the "underemployed",
or the inadequately utilized section of the labour force, in the developing countries.
The problem of underemployment is characterized in the developing countries
by shorter-than-normal work-weeks, very low wages and jobs which are a mismatch
*Warren C. Robinson is Professor of Economics and Director of Population Issues
ResearchCenter, PenrtsylvaniaState University,and NasreenAbbasi is Staff Demographerat the
Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad, Pakistan. The authors are thankful
to MoharnmadAfzal from whose thorough discussionsand comments they have profited.
(Please note that all Llsare assumed to be positive by convention.)
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